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Abstract. The American financial crisis, which began in late 2007 and 
spread to the rest of the world, did not spare the remote, small 
islands in the Pacific. With the decline in economic activities in the 
advanced countries, the American financial crisis soon became a 
global economic crisis, triggering a world-wide recession since then. 
Following the onset of global recession, Pacific island counties have  
been experiencing the impact in varying degrees. The global crisis 
has posed challenges with both short- and long-term implications. 
While the short-term challenges are thought to be dealt with by fiscal 
and monetary policies, which have only a limited scope, the long-run 
challenges can be looked upon as opportunities for renewing efforts 
towards sustained growth as well as minimizing the impacts of 
similar future uncertainties. This paper, which deals with six major 
countries in the South Pacific region, namely Fiji, Papua New 
Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga and Vanuatu, seeks to 
examine policy options, including regional economic integration. 
 
Introduction  
 
The ongoing global economic crisis, which had its origins in the American 
banking and financial sector disaster in mid-2007 spread to the 
industrialized countries across the Atlantic as a consequence of their 
exposure to US mortgaged debts.  
 
The global financial crisis, which eventually became a global recession 
began to affect the small Pacific island countries (PICs)1, even though they 
                                                           
∗ Dr T.K. Jayaraman teaches at the University of the South Pacific, Fiji since 1998. Earlier, he 
was on the staff of the Asian Development Bank, Manila. He obtained MA and Ph.D degrees 
from the University of Hawaii, Honolulu, where he studied as an East West Center Grantee 
and a Fulbright-Mundt Fellow.  
1  The 14 independent Pacific island countries (PICs), which are the members of the formal 
inter-governmental organization, known as Pacific Islands Forum are: Cook Islands, Fiji, 
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did not have any such exposure. All of them are now experiencing the 
impact of the on-going ”great recession”2 (Heyzer 2009). 
  
This paper analyses the challenges thrown up by the global crisis and the 
PICs’ responses.  However, policy options open to the 14 PICs vary. Eight 
of them are dollarized economies,3 having adopted the currencies of three 
major economies in the region as legal tender ever since their political 
independence.  Thus, their hands are tied, as they do not have the option of 
pursuing monetary or exchange rate policies. The remaining six of them 
have independent currencies. Except Papua New Guinea, which switched 
on to a flexible exchange regime in 1994, the other five PICs namely, Fiji, 
Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga and Vanuatu, have fixed exchange rate 
regimes. These six PICs, being relatively larger economies, have 
maintained consistent databases. Hence, the paper focuses only on these six 
PICs utilizing their data series on national income and other critical 
variables.  
 
The paper is organized into four sections: the second section presents an 
economic background of PICs; the third section deals with policy options 
and actual responses; the fourth and last section presents a summary and 
lists some policy conclusions. 
 
                                                                                                                                      
Kiribati, Federated States of Micronesia, Marshall Islands, Nauru, Niue, Palau, Papua New 
Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu and Vanuatu.  
2 The term was coined by the United Nations and used by Under Secretary-General Heyzer 
(2009) in her Preface to the Economic and Social Survey of Asia and the Pacific (UNESCAP, 
2009) to distinguish the current recession from the Great Depression of the last century. 
Heyzer (2009) describes it as the product of three crises.   These three crises are: (i) volatility 
in and surging food and fuel prices in early 2008; (ii) the financial crisis in the advanced 
countries; and (iii) climate change calamities. The first one precipitated rapid depletion of 
foreign exchange reserves of PICs. Although the financial sector institutions in PICs were 
not exposed to the sub-prime mortgage securities, climate change calamities, which 
adversely affected agricultural lands and hurt their narrow range of export products, which 
include fruits and vegetables and sugar.  
3  The legal tender of Cook Islands and Niue is the New Zealand dollar; of Kiribati, Nauru 
and Tuvalu, the Australian dollar; and of Palau, Federated States of Micronesia and 
Marshall Islands, the United States dollar. 
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Background 
 
The PICs are grouped into three: Melanesian, Polynesian and Micronesian 
countries. They display a wide variety of characteristics (Table 1), with 
population levels ranging from less than 2,000 in Niue to nearly six million 
in PNG. The Melanesian group (Fiji, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands 
and Vanuatu) with their large volcanic islands have arable land and a good 
supply of water, making them suitable for agriculture.  
 
The Polynesian countries (Tonga, Samoa and Cook Islands) have small 
populations, with little potential for large scale agriculture and 
manufacturing and hence have to depend more on tourism and to a smaller 
extent, fisheries. 
 
The Micronesian countries are mostly coral atolls countries with a much 
less resource base, being dependent on remittances, trust funds and 
fisheries exports for their income.4  
 
Growth Performance 
 
Table 2 presents the annual real GDP growth rates for the six PICs. While 
PNG, Samoa, Solomon Islands and Vanuatu recorded positive annual 
growth rates, Fiji and Tonga performed rather poorly. The main reason 
behind Fiji’s and Tonga’s poor growth is political instability following the 
military coup in 2006 in Fiji, and pro-democracy riots in 2005 in Tonga.  
Amongst the better performers, the success of PNG and Solomon Islands is 
mainly due to growth in exports: of mineral and non-minerals and tree-
crops in the case of PNG; and exports of logs of timber in the case of 
Solomon Islands.  
 
In the absence of any spectacular growth in exports, prudent fiscal and 
monetary policies supported by remittances in the case of Samoa and surge 
in  tourism receipts in the case of Vanuatu helped to maintain growth (UN 
ESCAP 2010). 
 
                                                           
4 For a fuller treatment of on main determinants of growth in the six PICs and their major 
economic sectors, including tourism, fisheries and their contribution to GDP in recent years, 
especially before the crisis, see Browne (2006a) and Jayaraman (2008).  
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Table 1 
PICs: General Indicators (2008) 
 
Country Pop. 
(‘000) 
(2008) 
 
Pop. 
Growth 
(1991-2000) 
Population 
Density 
Urban 
Population 
(%) 
GDP per 
Capita 
 (US$) 
Melanesia 
Fiji 853 1.0 47 51 3,306 
PNG 5,995 2.5 13 14 943 
Solomon Is. 489 2.8 17 17 684 
Vanuatu 215 2.7 18 24 1,799 
Polynesia 
Cook Is. 22 0.6 91 70 7,549 
Niue 1.8 -2.2 6.9 33 4,364 
Samoa 186 0.8 66 23 2,277 
Tonga 102 0.4 142 24 2,176 
Tuvalu 10 1.6 381 48 1,346 
Micronesia 
FSM 111 2.0 159 22 2,205 
Kiribati 101 2.2 138 48 703 
Marshall Is. 65 1.9 636 67 2,363 
Nauru 10 0.6 482 100 3,500 
Palau 20 2.0 85 12 671 
Comparators 
Low-Income 
Countries 
- 2.0 85 12 671 
Middle-Income 
Countries 
- 1.1 45 53 6,564 
 
Source: Prasad (2009) supplemented by AusAID and the World Bank. 
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Table 2 
PICs: Growth Performance: 1995-2009 
Real GDP Growth Rate (%) 
Year Fiji PNG Samoa 
Solomon 
Islands 
Tonga Vanuatu 
 
1995 2.1 -3.3 6.6 5.4 2.9 4.7 
1996 4.8 6.6 7.3 1.9 -0.5 7.2 
1997 -2.2 -6.3 0.8 -1.7 -3.2 8.6 
1998 1.3 4.7 2.4 3.2 3.5 4.3 
1999 8.8 1.9 3.1 -1.6 2.3 -3.2 
2000 -1.6 -2.5 7.1 -14.2 5.4 2.7 
2001 1.9 -0.1 8.1 -8.2 7.2 -2.6 
2002 3.2 -0.2 1.8 -2.8 1.4 -7.4 
2003 0.9 2.2 3.1 6.5 3.4 3.2 
2004 5.5 2.7 3.4 8.0 1.1 5.5 
2005 0.6 3.7 5.2 5.0 -3.3 6.5 
2006 3.4 2.6 2.6 6.1 4.4 7.2 
2007 -6.6 6.7 6.1 10.3 -0.3 6.6 
2008 -1.2 7.3 3.3 7.0 1.0 5.7 
2009 -2.5 5.5 -0.8 0.4 0.4 3.4 
Source: ADB (2010b), UNESCAP (2009) 
 
Trade Relations  
 
For their foreign exchange earnings the PICs depend upon a narrow range 
of exports, the exception being PNG, which is indeed an outlier in this 
regard. Their exports are mostly fish, fruits and vegetables. Thus they 
compete with each other.5 Their exports except in the case of PNG 
(minerals) and Fiji (sugar) are similar and they seek the same markets. 
There is little inter-regional trade amounting to only 15% of total exports 
(Prasad 2009, Jayaraman 2007a, Browne 2006a). As the word economy was 
booming in the early years of this century and just before the full brunt of 
global recession came to be felt, PICs experienced fairly reasonable growth, 
average rate being 5.1%, thanks to growth performance of two commodity-
exporting economies of PNG (minerals and non minerals) and Solomon 
Islands (logs of timber). 
                                                           
5 For a fuller discussion on trade relations, see Prasad (2009), Browne (2006a) and Jayaraman 
(2007a. 2007b). 
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The bulk of exports and imports of the PICs are from four sources—
Australia (wheat and rice, milk, meat and manufactured and primary 
processed goods), New Zealand (milk, meat and processed goods), USA 
(manufactured goods, machinery and transport), Singapore (petroleum 
products) and Japan (machinery and transport) (Prasad 2009). Economic 
conditions in these sources have major impacts on PICs  
 
The trade share of GDP for the PICs varies as shown in Table 3.  For some 
of the remittance-dependent economies including Tuvalu, Kiribati, Samoa 
and Tonga (Browne 2006b), the decline in imports caused by lower 
remittances can have implications for overall trade volumes. For most of 
them, a decline in trade volumes will have direct implications for the GDP, 
which means lower growth rates in the future (Prasad 2009). 
 
Table 3 
Trade Share of GDP 
 
Country 
Trade Share 
of GDP 
(2009) 
 
Cook Islands 74.0 
Fiji 82.9 
Kiribati 92.3 
Marshal Is 59.2 
Fed States of Micronesia 56.9 
Nauru 166.9 
Palau 115.7 
PNG 79.9 
Samoa 44.9 
Solomon Islands 55.1 
Tonga 53.7 
Tuvalu 42.1 
 
Source: ADB (2010) 
 
Twin Deficits 
 
Declining aid for budgetary support and rising domestic public sector 
expenditure since the 1990s and stagnant tax revenues led to widening 
budget deficits (Table 4). With continuing dependency on imports of all 
T.K. Jayaraman 
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food items including rice and wheat, besides fuel and manufactured goods, 
led to further widening trade deficits (Table 5). However, remittances 
continued to provide valuable support to the traditionally remittances 
dependent economies of Samoa and Tonga and resurgence of tourism in 
Vanuatu at the cost of Fiji, which had experienced political instability 
following the military coup in December 2006.  
 
Table 4 
Fiscal Balance as % of GDP 
 1991-2000 2001-2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Fiji -3.4 -5.1 -3.4 -2.1 0.5 -3.0 
PNG -2.2 -1.3 3.2 2.6 -2.2 -0.1 
Samoa -5.3 -1.1 -0.5 0.6 -1.9 -4.1 
Solomon Is. -2.8 -5.9 -3.9 -0.7 -3.7 0.1 
Tonga -0.7 2.3 -0.7 3.8 3.6 1.3 
Vanuatu -3.3 -0.9 0.9 -0.3 2.1 0.9 
Source : ADB (2010) , World Bank (2010) 
 
Table 5 
Trade Balance as % of GDP 
  1991-2000 2001-2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Fiji -12.7 -19.6 -31.2 -26.8 -33.2 -27.0 
PNG 19.2 27.4 40.1 33.5 33.2 19.1 
Samoa -60.1 -82.3 -46.1 -38.6 -44.0 -37.2 
Solomon Is. 0.2 -0.6 -17.4 -17.6 -15.4 -13.4 
Tonga -26.7 -28.9 -36.1 -31.2 -36.2 -40.0 
Vanuatu -22.3 -21.8 -25.3 -29.6 -33.7 -35.3 
Source : ADB (2010) 
 
Impact on PICs  
 
It was feared that decline in economic activities and fall in disposable 
incomes in advanced countries, especially in Australia and New Zealand, 
would lead to decrease in PICS’ exports, decline in tourist arrivals and fall 
in remittances. 
 
Fiji suffered a greater setback in tourism, than initially expected, despite 
the April 2009 devaluation of its currency by 20%. One clear reason was 
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that political developments in April 2009, which included sacking of 
judges, abrogation of the Constitution and a clampdown on the Press and 
other restrictions on individual freedoms, were serious impediments to 
growth in tourism. Nearly 30% decline in tourism was forecast for Fiji 
(Asian Development Bank, 2009). 
 
Soon after the December 2006 coup, Vanuatu benefited from the diversion 
of tourist traffic away from Fiji in 2007, 2008 and 2009. However, in 2010, 
due to heavy discounting by Fiji’s national airline, the Air Pacific and hotel 
industry as well as economic recovery in Australia in particular, tourist 
arrivals in Fiji improved and the arrival numbers hit a record at 600,000.  
 
As regards inward remittances, the prospects for Samoa and Tonga, which 
contribute about 25% of their GDP, were initially considered not bright due 
to deterioration in job markets in US, Australia and New Zealand. With rise 
in joblessness, the overseas Samoan and Tongan residents were expected to 
be less likely to keep up the past tempo in remitting funds back home in 
months to come.6  
 
The global economic downturn with declining demand for mineral and 
non-mineral products ended the commodity boom enjoyed by resource 
rich PICs. Two PICs, PNG with mineral resources and Solomon Islands 
with log exports immensely benefited from the high prices in the 
commodity market. It aided spectacular growth in GDP in PNG in 2007 (6.7 
percent) and in 2008 (7.3 percent); and in Solomon Islands in 2007 (10.3 
percent) and in 2008 (7.0 percent). While PNG’s exports are more 
diversified with petroleum and gas and other mineral products along with 
agricultural exports including coffee, cocoa and tea (about 95% of export 
earnings), Solomon Islands’ exports were more in terms of timber (70% of 
export earnings) and palm oil.  With fall in demand for both mineral and 
non-mineral agricultural exports combined with drop in prices, both PNG 
and Solomon Islands were not able to maintain the same past level of 
export earnings and growth rates in 2008 and 2009, as experienced in 
earlier years. In PNG, the kina export price index declined by 32% in the 
final quarter of 2008. There was a fall in log export price in Solomon 
Islands, as signs of contraction in log importing advanced counties were 
                                                           
6  However, subsequent developments showed that remittances were resilient. Remittances 
continued to be almost at the same level in Fiji and  in Samoa they declined in 2009 but 
recovered in late 2010. 
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clear. While PNG’s growth rate declined to 5.5% in 2009, Solomon Islands 
growth deteriorated considerably. It was a negative 2.2% 
 
With recovery in Australia beginning in late 2009, commodity prices 
quickly recovered in PNG and economic growth picked up by around 7% 
in 2010 compared to 5.5% in 2009. Growth rates became positive reaching 
4% in 2010. Table 6 presents the estimated growth rates and forecasts of all 
six PICs for 2010 and 2011.  
 
To sum up, it was initially held that since the financial sectors of PICs  were 
insulated as they were not exposed to subprime mortgage loans, these 
countries could possibly escape the impact of crisis. The second and third 
round effects of the financial crisis leading to fall in aggregate demand and 
in incomes in the originating economies, came to be felt in all PICs. The 
transmission mechanisms have been broadly along the following lines: 
decline in demand for primary products and resultant lower commodity 
prices; fall in employment and incomes in source countries and decrease in 
tourist arrivals; decline in inward remittances; adverse impact on assets 
held overseas and erosion of offshore trust funds; and poor domestic 
private investor confidence.  
 
Response to the Crisis 
 
Response to the crisis in terms of countercyclical action depends upon 
whether the country concerned has scope for expansionary fiscal or 
monetary policies. Further, a greater challenge is to ensure that spending on 
social protection is not compromised. While developed countries can 
consider and strengthen their social safety-nets, which include both 
unconditional and conditional cash transfers to poor households, and public 
works programmes (Ravallion, 2008), there is limited scope in developing 
countries, since they have little fiscal or current account leeway (Hostland, 
2008).   
 
Further, in developing countries, as international reserves were dwindling in 
the face of widening trade deficits and rise in current account deficits, there 
will be mounting pressures on exchange rates  (Naude, 2009).  In fact, Fiji 
had to devalue its currency by 20% in 2009 when there were rumours about 
the weak currency. In April 2009, its international reserves were low, which 
were just enough to cover a month’s imports) and the speculators were 
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attacking the currency under the expectations that currency would be 
devalued.  
 
There are limitations to fiscal expansion, which stem forth from the already 
entrenched constraints to macroeconomic management in PICs (Jayaraman 
2008).  Except PNG, Tonga and Vanuatu, all PICs have been running 
budget deficits in recent years (Table 6). Any attempt to raise domestic 
aggregate demand by running fiscal deficits with a view to offsetting 
declines in external demand would have disastrous effects and can only be 
inflationary, unless there is effective trimming of their budgets.  
 
Table 6 
Pacific Island Countries: Updated Key Indicators 
Countries Fiji PNG SAM SOL TON VAN 
Growth 2010 e  (%) 0.1 7.0 0.0 4.0 -1.2 3.0 
Growth 2011f (%) 0.5 8.5 2.1 7.5 0.5 4.2 
Fiscal Bal 2010e (% GDP) -3.5 -4.0 -7.8 -5.5 -0.6 0.0 
Inflation (%) 2010 e 5.0 7.2 2.8 0.7 5.1 1.3 
Trade Bal (% of GDP) 2010e -32.8 22.8 -44.1 -15.7 -30.3 -31.6 
Reserves Import cover in 
months (2010) e 3.8 10.5 7.2 8.7 7.5 6.0 
Notes: e= estimate; f= forecast 
 
Any fiscal stimulus effort is a risky venture unless there are supportive 
measures in place. These are: (i) undertaking more vigorous revenue 
collection efforts; (ii) effecting changes in the current expenditure 
composition by cutting wasteful expenditures and ambitious projects; and 
(iii) diverting the saved resources towards labour intensive and quick 
yielding projects including rehabilitation and upgrading infrastructure 
(Jayaraman, 2008). In the absence of fiscal deficits being financed by 
domestic tax revenue efforts, such deficits eventually lead to monetization 
of deficits.  
 
On the other hand, expansionary monetary policy to boost domestic 
demand to compensate for falling external demand for limited range of 
exports and demand for tourism services would be disastrous. Since the 
financial sectors in the six PICs under study are at nascent stages, empirical 
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studies have shown that the transmission mechanisms of monetary policy 
decisions are weak (Jayaraman, 2010a, 2009c, 2008d) and monetary policy 
is generally ineffective in impacting growth (Jayaraman, 2011). Further, 
excess demand created by rise in loose monetary policy will spill over into 
external sector as increase in demand for imports. Given the current low 
level of export earnings, expansionary monetary policy or fiscal policy or a 
combination of both policies for boosting domestic demand will only 
widen trade deficits. Twin deficits have occurred time and again in PICs.7 
Trade deficits, if not controlled by reducing budget deficits, lead to 
worsening of  the current account imbalances, which would lead to 
pressures on exchange rate under fixed exchange rate regime, fanning 
speculation rumours relating to eventual devaluation.8  
   
One tool in the hands of PICs which have independent currencies, namely 
Fiji, PNG9, Samoa, Solomon Islands and Tonga is devaluation of the 
currency to improve external demand for domestic goods and tourism 
services.10 The efficacy of this tool depends primarily on the well-known 
conditions, given other factors, that domestic demand for imports and 
overseas demand for exports should be greater than unity.11   
 
The 2009 devaluation of Fiji’s currency has revealed the inadequacies of 
devaluation as an option to meet the impact of global economic downturn. 
While demand for imports for fuel and food have remained constant, only 
imports of capital and intermediate goods have been falling, reflecting the 
sluggishness of domestic demand due to poor investment climate.12  
Besides these developments, the exchange rate pass-through effect on 
inflation has been quite high. The already disadvantaged sections of the 
community now have to bear greater impact of rise in price level of all 
essential items.  
                                                           
7  For empirical studies on  twin deficit hypotheses in Fiji and Vanuatu, see Jayaraman and 
Choong (2007; 2008) and for a panel study, see Jayaraman, Choong and Law (2010).  
8  For an empirical study on pressures on exchange rate of Fiji, see Jayaraman and Choong  
(2008). 
9  Although PNG has a floating exchange rate, it prefers to intervene and sells kina for 
avoiding appreciation of  its currency.  
10  This remedy is not available to dollarized economies. 
11  This is known as Marshall-Lerner theorem. 
12  This is more due to impact of political instability introduced by military coup and 
continuing uncertainties associated with current isolation of Fiji by Australia and New 
Zealand with sanctions of all kinds as well as suspension of Fiji from the Commonwealth.   
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The prospects of greater aid inflows13 appear dim, as the traditional donors 
to PICs are now pre-occupied with their domestic economies and their 
priorities have now changed (UNESCAP 2009). Supplementing domestic 
resources with external borrowing is certainly an option open to all PICs14, 
whose external debt levels are relatively low.  Further, all PICs except Fiji 
are eligible to borrow on concessional terms from international lending 
institutions including Asian Development Bank (ADB). The ADB 
announced a scheme of financial assistance by way of short-term loans to 
its member countries15, known as Countercyclical Support Facility (CSF). 
However, no PIC utilized the facility so far.  
 
Fiji, which is not eligible for loans on concessional terms as it is in the 
category of lower middle-income countries, floated its first ever 
international bond in September 2006  for US$150 million at an interest rate 
of 7%.   
 
It was a successful issue as it was oversubscribed, thanks to a then 
favourable rating by various agencies. Fiji again floated another 
international bond in April 2011 for an amount of US$250 million at a rate 
of 9%, despite a rating of -B for its overseas bonds by Standard and Poor’s. 
 
                                                           
13  For an empirical analysis on foreign aid inflows to PICs and  their contribution to growth 
in PICs, see Jayaraman and Ward (2006).  
14  For an empirical panel study on external debt and growth in PICS, see Jayaraman and 
Lau, (2009). 
15  In May 2009, ADB announced the establishment of a US $3 billion Countercyclical 
Support Facility (CSF) that would provide short term loans faster, and cheaper special 
programme loan facilities, aiming at supporting its member countries’ fiscal spending to 
counter the crisis, if they lack the financial means to do so amid tight global credit 
conditions and a sharp increase in funding costs. Additionally, it will also make available 
a further $400 million under Asian Development Fund (ADF) Facility for providing 
concessional loans to poorer member countries, which include all PICs except Fiji being a 
middle income country. The ADF resources are available to eligible countries through 
loans and grants. The resources will provide crucial budget support and funds to finance 
key development projects in poorer countries that are among the most fiscally constrained 
in responding to the crisis. However, Fiji which was in dire need of foreign exchange, as 
its international reserves were at the lowest  level,  being sufficient just to cover one 
month’s imports, did not utilize the facility. Instead, it devalued its currency, apparently 
for the reason that it wanted to avoid any loan from ADB which would carry 
conditionalities. For similar reason, Fiji gave up its efforts in November 2010  to borrow  
US$500 million from IM, which were initiated in April 2011.  
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The purpose was to pay off the 2006 bond obligations, which are due in 
September 2011. The remaining amount is expected to be spent on capital 
projects aimed at promoting tourism and other growth enhancing projects. 
 
Since Fiji’s external debt level as a percent of GDP is much lower than the 
levels of external debt in other PICs, the debt burden is expected not to 
expose the country to high risks. However, it remains to be seen how far 
the reform process would be carried through in the coming years as there is 
no external pressure on Fiji in the form of conditionalities which would 
have been imposed by IMF or ADB, had Fiji borrowed from either of the 
two multilateral agencies.  
 
Policy Implications 
 
The challenges faced by PICs in the face of the global economic crisis are 
formidable, but not insurmountable. However, the process of meeting the 
challenges cannot be through the expansionary policies as adopted by 
developed countries. There is not much fiscal space in PICs, except PNG 
and Vanuatu. These two countries through their prudent fiscal policies 
since the early 2000s had built in budget surpluses and international 
reserves to meet contingencies during bad times. In all other economies, the 
position is different. 
 
Further, any loose monetary policy would not work, as financial sectors in 
PICs with independent currencies are not well developed and monetary 
policy transmission mechanism is weak. Thus, PICs’ central bank responses 
to global economic downturn have been largely ineffective (Jayarama, 
2009b).  In these circumstances the age old remedy seems appropriate: the 
Victorian rectitude.16 The troubled countries in Europe falling under the 
label of PIGS (Portugal, Ireland, Greece and Spain) and the United 
Kingdom have now embarked on austerity programmes: cutting wasteful 
expenditures and trimming public sector. It is only by these efforts, the 
current account imbalances can be made sustainable.  
                                                           
16  The term is derived from the budget presented by British Prime Minister Gladstone under 
Queen Victoria. Gladstone was also the Leader of Liberal Party. Gladstonian Liberalism 
consisted of “limited government expenditure and low taxation whilst making sure 
government had balanced budgets”.  
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In the medium term, by these austerity measures, the current imbalances 
can be offset by inflow of foreign domestic investment and other capital 
inflows, as FDI and capital inflows can be attracted only by sound policies 
which will raise credibility and assure the overseas investors of safety of 
their capital and return. 
 
In the long run, PICs should seek deeper integration of their economies and 
forge a closer relationship with Australia, since Australia has shown its 
remarkable resilience by its economic performance during the last three 
critical years. By integrating the economies with Australia by trade in 
goods and services and investment, PICs would be in a position to shield 
themselves from the adverse effects of volatility in business cycles in the 
rest of the world (Jayaraman, 2007a).  
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